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Representational Enactivism
Zhexi Zhang
Abstract: In the literature on enactive approaches to cognition, representationalism is
often seen as a rival theory. In this paper, I argue that enactivism can be fruitfully
combined with representationalism by adopting Frances Egan’s content pragmatism.
This representational enactivism avoids some of the problems faced by antirepresentational versions of enactivism. Most significantly, representational
enactivism accommodates empirical evidence that neural systems manipulate
representations. In addition, representational enactivism provides a valuable insight
into how to identify representational content, especially in brainless organisms: we
can identify representational content by investigating autopoietic processes.

1. Introduction
Representationalists hold that cognition involves internal states that represent things
in the external world. Enactive approaches to cognition are usually understood as
rejecting representations. Instead, they begin their accounts of cognition with action,
and concentrate on how an organism dynamically interacts with the external world.
For example, autopoietic enactivists contend that the origin of cognition should be
found at the level of biological self-organization. That is, where actions such as
growth, repair and regeneration occur (Varela and Maturana 1980; Thompson 2007).
Radical enactivists explicitly argue that basic forms of cognition, such as perception,
are completely non-representational (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017).
Significant problems emerge, however, by rejecting representations. One problem
is that some higher forms of cognition like thought and language clearly do involve
representations. This is something even radical enactivists concede (Hutto and Myin
2013, 2017). In response, radical enactivists mostly focus on basic cognition. So, at its

2

best, radical enactivism seems to be an incomplete theory of cognition, even if it ends
up being true. A second problem is that dismissing the explanatory value of
representations makes it difficult for enactivism to explain why representational terms
are so widely used in cognitive science.
In this essay, I will argue that there is a version of representationalism enactivists
can accept: content pragmatism (Egan 2010, 2014, forthcoming; Coelho Mollo 2020).
Content pragmatism acknowledges the utility of representations but does not commit
to the ontological reality of representational content. It treats representational content
as an explanatory gloss that depends on pragmatic considerations. Egan admits the
indispensability of representations and content in fruitful cognitive science, but she
rejects the idea that representational content is real in cognitive systems. For her,
content is dependent on pragmatic concerns about how the specific content of a
representation can offer a helpful explanation. It appears to me, then, that enactivists
can accept content pragmatism, and appeal to representations for their explanatory
value when representational terms are used in the best scientific theories. But they do
not need to accept robust realism about representational content.
When it comes to representationalism, there are at least three options. First,
robust realists believe that both representations and content are real. Second,
eliminativists such as, radical enactivists, hold that both representations and content
should be eliminated. Egan’s content pragmatism is a third option. Unlike
eliminativists, content pragmatists hold that representations are ineliminable parts of
cognitive systems. Unlike robust realists, they argue that the notion of content does
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not capture anything real in cognitive systems. I will argue that both
representationalists and enactivists should consider this third option when it comes to
non-human cognition: the representational content of non-human cognition is not a
real property of the cognitive system but can still be attributed to the system based on
pragmatic concerns.
The primary aim of this essay is to defend a representational version of
enactivism. Here is how I will proceed. In Section 2, I examine how Hutto and Myin’s
radical enactivism is problematic: it seems to contradict our best neuroscientific
evidence. Motivated by that concern, I argue for representational enactivism by
bridging enactivism and content pragmatism. In Section 3, I explain how it is possible
to understand content pragmatism in ways that make it look compatible with
enactivism. In Section 4, I take a step further and explore how the idea of autopoietic
enactivism can be incorporated into mainstream representationalist approaches:
representational enactivism helps to identify the content of representations by
analyzing organisms’ exercise of skillful know-how in the environment.
The representational enactivism defended in this essay has two main benefits.
First, it allows enactivists to draw on successful representational explanations in the
areas where enactive theories have almost nothing to say (e.g., about the neural
mechanisms underlying human propositional thought and language). Second, when no
neural evidence is available in brainless organisms like bacteria, representationalists
can appeal to the dynamical resources emphasized by enactivists to explain their
patterns of cognition and behavior. This is possible as long as enactivism does not
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imply eliminativism about representations.

2. Radical Enactivism and Representationalism
This section will introduce radical enactivism and explain why it is at odds with
representationalism. Referring to radical enactivism is important since, of all the
versions of enactivism, radical enactivism opposes representationalism most strongly.
I intend to show that even radical enactivism can be made compatible with
representationalism.
Radical enactivists do not believe that basic cognitive phenomena are
representational, including cognitive phenomena like perception. They do admit that
certain sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational, such as human
thoughts involving linguistic or otherwise symbolic content (Hutto and Myin 2013,
2017). Radical enactivism is most distinctive for its commitments regarding the nonrepresentational structure of “basic cognition”. This is despite the fact that it is widely
assumed in cognitive science that cognition should be explained in terms of
computations that manipulate representations.1
For radical enactivists, basic cognition (e.g., that of simple organisms) is
intentional, but not representational. They hold that there is a form of intentionality
which cannot be explained by representationalist approaches. In representationalist
frameworks, intentionality, which is the ability to be about something, can be

Views on the nature of representations differ. For example, representations are symbols for Fodor (1975), while
they are subsymbolic activation patterns for connectionists. But many theorists may agree with Carey (2009, p. 5)
that representations are “states of the nervous system that have content, that refer to concrete or abstract (or even
fictional) entities, properties and events” (cf. Schlicht and Starzak 2019).
1
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explained in terms of representation. For example, when I see a glass of water, some
perceptual state of mine is representing it; when I am thinking about the usefulness of
the glass of water, some computational states are representing how I will use it.
Radical enactivists just deny that such relations between intentionality and
representation always hold.
Radical enactivists try to “disentangle” directedness and aboutness (Hutto and
Myin 2017) in order to make this point. Directedness and aboutness are important as
they are two aspects of intentionality which can be traced back to Brentano
(1874/1995). “Directedness” means the direction toward an object in external
perception or the direction toward humans’ own mental phenomena in inner
perception (Brentano 1874/1995, p. 22). “Aboutness” means the intentional reference
to a content in some propositional attitude.
To argue for the existence of intentionality without representational content,
radical enactivists emphasize that aboutness is contentful and may depend on complex
linguistic capacities, whereas directedness is manifested in basic, contentless
cognition. Our understanding of the former—the contentful and sophisticated form of
intentionality—cannot be generalized to basic intentionality (Hutto and Myin 2017).
In this way, radical enactivists reject the idea that sophisticated human thought is the
most typical or paradigmatic form of intentionality. The two types of intentionality
should not be treated the same, and the most primitive form of intentionality lacks
content. This basic intentionality without content or representations is sometimes
called “Ur-intentionality” (Hutto 2008). By using this terminology, radical enactivists
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intend to capture how the attitude of the whole organism is directed toward an object,
without turning to contentful mental states of the organism.
In this sense, the radical enactivist view is clearly related to Gibson’s ecological
approach to perceptions. Gibson (1979) puts stress on what the environment offers the
organisms: organisms directly perceive what is accessible to them in the environment,
including both good things and bad things. In other words, the perceiver immediately
gets a bunch of information about the affordances in the environment; affordances are
operationalized in terms of informational availability. Hutto and Myin (2013) use the
term “worldly offerings”, which has a similar meaning to Gibson’s affordances, to
demonstrate the enactivist idea: an organism’ immediate response to certain worldly
offerings does not require its brain to produce representations of the environment.
This form of the agent’s dynamic response to the stimulus, as it moves around in the
environment, is contentless. This is because the minimal kind of intentionality that it
requires to explain those responses, directedness, is contentless. However, especially
in light of Schlicht and Starzak (2019)’s discussion on the dilemma proponents of
radical enactivism face, there are reasons to think that their focus on so-called
contentless cognition is problematic.
Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) reject content on the level of basic cognitive
phenomena because of the connection they make between the content and the
conditions for the truth, or accuracy, of linguistic utterances. The notion of content as
they interpret it can be encapsulated in the following: there is content if and only if
there are specified satisfaction conditions for truth or accuracy (Hutto and Myin

7

2013). The idea is that in order to have representational content, an agent should be
sensible to norms and capable of exhibiting public and intersubjective behavior that
conforms to those norms. If not, the agent and other agents around her would have no
clue about whether the content of the agent’s mental state is true or accurate. It is
possible to have contentful states only after the “construction of sociocultural
cognitive niches in the human lineage” (Hutto and Myin 2017, p. 134). Therefore,
according to this line of thought, it seems that only humans can have contentful
cognition and mental representations. By contrast, basic and contentless forms of
cognition are prevalent in animals. It is wrong, therefore, to conclude that all forms of
cognition are representational just because human thought is representational. This is
one of the most important arguments put forward by radical enactivists.
Schlicht and Starzak (2019) argue against Hutto and Myin’s view by questioning
whether perceiving Gibsonian affordances can happen without any conditions on truth
or accuracy. They point out that many theorists do believe that experiencing
affordances presuppose accuracy conditions of some kind.2 For example, before I
react appropriately to some affordances of the mug, my perceptual experience must
present the mug as having certain properties, such as being in a certain shape and size
and being able to be picked up or thrown away (Martens and Schlicht 2018).
Affordances can also be misperceived, when nonvisual information is at odds with the
visual information. A bench may appear to someone sittable enough for an adult to sit
on, but in fact it is severely rotten (Palmer 1999, p. 412). When the experience
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The philosophers they refer to include Siegel (2014) and Palmer (1999).
8

becomes inaccurate, the organism may fail to respond to the affordances in an ideal
way. The concern about truth or accuracy motivates some philosophers to advance
ways in which the perception of affordances can be integrated into a
representationalist framework (e.g., Bruner 1964, cf. Schlicht and Starzak 2019).
There is content whenever there are satisfaction conditions for truth or accuracy, but
radical enactivism rejects content completely on the level of “basic phenomena”
including perceptions. The difficulty with specifying satisfaction conditions without
using any representationalist framework constitutes part of the reason why I want to
bridge enactivism and representionalism.
As I mentioned earlier, radical enactivists maintain that basic cognitive
phenomena such as perception are non-representational. No representation is needed
because the perception of affordances is direct. Schlicht and Starzak (2019) break this
direct perception of affordances into two parts: the no-preceding-processing claim and
the no-subsequent-processing claim. For the sake of time, we will only see how the
former is refuted: neuroscientific evidence demonstrates that we cannot perceive
affordances directly.
The no-preceding-processing claim is that perceiving affordances is direct: it does
not require any preceding processing before the generation of responses to what the
environment affords. But, as Schlicht and Starzak (2019) argue, the best
neuroscientific evidence regarding perception shows that the perception of
affordances is not direct. There are prior stages before perceiving affordances, like for
instance the categorization of objects. Perceiving objects’ affordances is the final
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stage. For instance, grasping the possible affordances of a mailbox cannot solely rely
on the perception of the mailbox—one should already have some knowledge about
the mailing system in order to identify it as such (Palmer 1999). Perceiving
affordances then involves some prior processing related to features like shape and
color. Representationalists call the internal states about shape and color sensory
representations.
At this point, I need to say more about why neuroscience suggests that
representations exist. Thomson and Piccinini (2018) use empirical evidence from
neuroscience to argue for the existence of neural representations. The three kinds of
representations discussed in that article are sensory representations, representations
uncoupled from current sensory stimulation, and motor representations. On their view,
neuroscientists do not merely posit neural representations, rather, they observe and
manipulate them. Neuroscientists do this by establishing that some neural signals fit
the criteria of representations (Thomson and Piccinini 2018, pp. 195-196). The criteria
are (1) the signals carry information about a current state or a future state of the
environment, (2) there is a systematic mapping between the signals and a current or
future state of the environment, and (3) the system can use them to guide future
behavior, or the signals actually cause the future state of the environment.
Sensory representations give an organism a fallible but reliable access to the
environment and can be used to guide behavior. Thomson and Piccinini (2018) argue
that neuroscientists have discovered sensory representations at multiple levels of
organization in the nervous system. There are low-level sensory representations in the
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retina. Higher-level visual regions also contain representations of visual motion; for
example, area MT (Movshon and Newsome 1996) represents visual system.
Besides sensory presentations, philosophers are also interested in representations
that are uncoupled from current sensory stimulation. Uncoupled representations are
activation patterns in the nervous system that carry information about the past state of
the environment. The past state is a part of the broader mapping between internal and
external states that guides action (Thomson and Piccinini 2018, p. 205). An example
is birdsong learning. The two learning stages are sensory learning stage and
sensorimotor learning stage (Mooney 2009). In the former stage, young birds listen to
a tutor sing a song and acquire a memory of that song. In the latter stage, young birds
reproduce the song sang by the tutor. The song was stored in long-term memory so
that young birds can receive some error signals if there are differences between the
memory and the song they produce.
Motor representations are commands sent from the brain to the body to move.
Neuroscientists use motor maps to show which regions control which kinds of
movement.

3

Researchers have done studies on how the primary motor cortex (M1)

act together to control movement in the primate brain. There are two theories about
how M1 represents movement (Fetz 1992; cf. Thomson and Piccinini 2018, pp. 214215). Neuronal populations in primate animals either implicitly or explicitly
represents some feature by extracting information about that feature. The
representation is implicit when using it requires a great number of computational

An example is motor homunculus, which shows where muscles twitch when a person is electrically stimulated
(Penfield and Boldrey 1937; cf. Thomson and Piccinini 2018, p.211).
3
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steps, while the representation is explicit when not many computational steps are
needed. No matter which specific representational theory of M1 function is taken,
goal-directed commands are representational.
Sensory representations and motor representations are not always isolated from
one another. Piccinini holds that there are mixed representations (Piccinini 2020;
Thomson and Piccinini 2018), which are constructed in processes of sensorimotor
transformations. This happens when sensory representations are converted into motor
representations. Neural populations then produce sensory representations and motor
representations simultaneously.
The above are examples of different forms of representations that are supported
by neuroscience. Piccinini (2018, 2020) concludes that the complex control function
in neural systems necessarily involve structural representations. Structural
representations are surrogates for what they represent. The structure of system A is a
representation of structure B if A is homomorphic with B. Importantly, the
informational content of representational system A is relevant to the control functions
of system B (Morgan and Piccinini 2018).

4

A representation has two parts: a semantic content and a functional role
(Thomson and Piccinini 2018). Semantic content can be indicative or imperative
(Millikan 1984). Indicative content is about how the world is like, and imperative
content is about how the world will be. On the account of structural

Structural representations must have four elements: “(i) a homomorphism (partial isomorphism) between a
system of internal states and their target, (ii) a causal connection from the target to the internal states, (iii) the
possibility for
the internal states to be decoupled from their target, and (iv) a role in action control” (Piccinini 2018, p.3).
4
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representationalism, sensory representations have indicative content, and their
functions are to track the actual states of the world. Motor representations have
imperative content, and their functions are to produce behaviors and bring about new
states of the world. Thus, there is a match between representational content and
function. Taking sensory representation as an example, according to informational
teleosemantics (Neander 2017), teleosemantics assigns semantic content to sensory
representations based on natural semantic information in the environment. At the
same time, the function of the sensory system is to carry the same natural semantic
information, and then the neural signals can transmit that information and guide the
future behavior (cf. Thomson and Piccinini 2018, pp. 194-195). This relation between
function and content, however, is not held in every representational theory (e.g.,
Egan’s content pragmatism, which will be assessed in later sections). Since we have
seen the importance of representations in neuroscience, I will stop here for now and
return to enactivism.
Enactivists may be correct to claim that the phenomenology of experience
supports the idea that we directly experience the ways that something in the world is
useful. However, the details about neural processing leave open the possibility that a
representationalist account is correct, phenomenology aside. As Gallagher (2008, p.
537) comments, problems like how the inferior temporal cortex works are for
neuroscientists to solve empirically, not for ordinary perceivers to decide based on the
structure of their experience. Some enactivists, such as, Gallagher, seem content to
concentrate on phenomenology. All enactivists should accept neuroscientific theories
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about neural mechanisms.
Following Gallagher, it seems open for enactivists to limit their understanding of
direct perception to the phenomenological level, and to concede that the
phenomenology of direct perception is compatible with a representational account of
the machinery of perception, which in turn is supposed to provide neuroscientific
details for explaining how specific neural processing contributes to the appearance
that perception is direct. The neural details are not part of the phenomenology of
seeing how something in the environment affords certain actions.
If enactivism about human perception is mostly confined to phenomenology,
there appears to be no genuine conflict between representational and enactive
accounts of perception. This is because they are targeting different explananda: neural
mechanisms and phenomenology respectively. Because enactivism lacks a positive
account of the underlying mechanisms, enactivism and representationalism seem to be
concerned about different things. This is echoed in Piccinini (2018): “Ecological
psychologists argue that cognition is primarily explained in terms of dynamical
variables characterizing the interaction between agents and environments. According
to them, uncovering inner mechanisms is unnecessary” (p. 2).
Enactivists seem to be at a crossroads. On one hand they are silent about what the
specific neural mechanisms behind perception are. The neuroscientifc evidence about
perception seems to suggest that the processing of representations is real. But some
enactivists, on the other hand, claim that there is simply no representational content
involved in basic forms of cognition. Either enactivists can maintain that basic
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cognition is non-representational, or they should keep the notion of representation
because it is very useful in explaining the fruitful results in empirical research. But
then it looks as though radical enactivism is ruled out.
One way out would be implied by an account of representation that is still
compatible with an enactivist view of cognition. One option for enactivists is to
appeal to content pragmatism, which is developed by Egan (2010, 2014,
forthcoming): accept the explanatory value of representation when representational
contents seem unavoidable in cognitive science, but deny the ontological reality of
representations at the same time.

3. Content Pragmatism
Is it plausible to suppose that enactivists would accept this? Radical enactivists argue
that it is incorrect to define cognition in representational terms because only
sophisticated cognition has representational content. Radical enactivists are also
eliminativists who claim that representational content should be eliminated. For
radical enactivists, positing representational content with truth or accuracy conditions
does not add anything to the explanation of basic forms of cognition like perception
and action (Hutto and Myin 2013). Consider now robust realists. Robust realists hold
that representations and representational content are real features of cognitive
systems. Eliminativists, on the other hand, believe that someday the best science will
get rid of representations and content and instead explain cognition in purely
functional or neurophysiological terms (cf. Coelho Mollo 2020). Radical enactivists
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focus on basic forms of cognition, while autopoietic enactivists often base their theory
on simple organisms such as biological cells and bacteria (as we will see in Section
4). Then, (at least) prima facie, it seems that in both cases it would be difficult to
persuade enactivists to accept robust realism about representations.
Content pragmatism, however, does not involve this commitment to robust
realism. The core of this theory is that representational content is part of an
explanatory gloss informed by pragmatic considerations (Egan 2010, 2014,
forthcoming; Coelho Mollo 2020). Egan (forthcoming) emphasizes the distinction
between representational vehicle and representational content. The account of mental
representation defended by Egan couples a realist account of representational vehicles
with a pragmatic account of representational content (p. 22). The realization function
specifies the physically realized vehicles of representation, which are structures or
states of some sort. The interpretation function specifies the content of representation.
Therefore, like the states or structures posited in all well-confirmed scientific
explanations, the representational vehicles pinpointed by neuroscientists are real. By
contrast, representational content serves heuristic purposes but is not part of what
Egan calls the “theory proper” (Egan 2014). She means that representational content
is not the target phenomenon for computational theories to explain, and it should be
seen an explanatory gloss dependent on pragmatic considerations.
To see how content pragmatism can be defended, here is a question about how a
frog’s internal state represents a bug. Is it a fly, frog food, or a small dark moving
thing (Egan forthcoming, pp. 10-11)? Egan argues that this question cannot be
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answered if the specific explanatory concern is unknown. The representational content
is more likely to be a fly if the goal of the theory is to explain the frog’s behavior
within its environmental niche. On the other hand, the content being assigned is more
likely to be a small dark moving thing if the explanatory concern is about the frog’s
visual mechanisms. The specific goals or the pragmatic considerations are directly
contrary to naturalistic considerations about representational content. For example,
tracking theorists would claim that there is a causal relation between internal states
and external objects.5
Egan does not believe that there is a naturalistic content-determining relation that
will rule out the need to appeal to pragmatic considerations. However, it is noteworthy
that Egan does not intend to compromise the naturalistic credentials of neuroscience
(ibid., p. 14). This is because the “theory proper” is about representational vehicles
rather than about representational content. For Egan, only representational content is
independent of naturalistic considerations. There are still naturalistic constraints on
representational vehicles.
For organisms which are much simpler than human beings, I take content
pragmatism to be the best representationalist theory. Egan’s observation that human
beings’ mental representations, such as thoughts and feelings, are different from the
representations in mindless cognitive systems is noteworthy in this sense. For
example, although plants do not obviously have mental representations like humans

For example, Tye (1995) sees intentionality as a causal-informational relation between the internal state and the
distal entity, so that the representational content of the internal state is determined by the function of tracking the
distal entity.
5
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do, plants are believed to represent temporal properties because they have circadian
clocks. Egan points out that a naturalized account of representational content cannot
explain what is so special about mental representations and that “from a detached,
naturalistic perspective there may not be any distinctively mental representation”
(ibid., p. 27).
This idea is coherent with the motivation behind my defense of representational
enactivism. In Section 2 I showed how radical enactivists draw a distinction between
basic cognition and sophisticated cognition. Disregarding radical enactivists’
disputable viewpoints about human perception, there does appear to be a real
distinction between representations in mindless systems and human thoughts.
Without claiming that basic cognition is non-representational, it does seem right
that explaining some forms of cognition in much simpler organisms requires theories
besides the computational theories that function to explain human cognition well. So,
enactivists might also see content pragmatism as an attractive representational account
because it allows them to treat basic cognition and sophisticated cognition differently.
It might be a separate question whether Egan is correct to claim that (all)
representational content is purely an explanatory gloss, since much neuroscientific
evidence suggests that neural representations are real (Thomson & Piccinini 2018).6
But tackling that issue is not the aim of this essay. In the next section, we will have a
closer look at how a form of enactivism can be compatible with representationalism.

I think that content pragmatism is more likely to be true when it comes to simpler organisms whose
representational content is more difficult to determine.
6
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4. Enactivism and Representationalism
4.1 Autopoietic Enactivism
In earlier sections, I discussed why radical enactivism is problematic and explained
the idea of content pragmatism. Now I will focus on how autopoietic enactivism and
representationalism can be complementary. Compared with radical enactivism,
autopoietic enactivism is a better candidate for being integrated into a
representationalist framework because it does not “radically” preclude the existence
of representations. The representational enactivism I defend in what follows here is an
integration of autopoietic enactivism and content pragmatism.
The concept of autopoiesis, or self-organization, was introduced by Maturana and
Varela. In their usage, a closed system that has autonomy, self-reference and selfconstruction is an autopoietic system (1980). Autopoiesis is said to be the nature of
living systems, and based on this theory, they define cognition as a biological
phenomenon. Cognition is present in all forms of organisms, simple as well as
complex. No matter how simple an organism is, as long as it shows the behavior of
self-maintenance, it is cognitive by definition.
Based on my earlier discussion, it might be wrong for us to conclude that
representation is unnecessary for cognition. Everyone in this debate agrees that simple
organisms do not have nervous systems capable of supporting the formation of
representations like human beings. Radical enactivists are happy with this
observation. However, we should choose an alternative route offered by content
pragmatists: cognition in simple organisms is still representational, but the
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representational content is dependent on specific explanatory purposes. Without
neuroscientific evidence, it seems impossible for us to identify representational
content in a reliable and purely naturalistic way.
Thompson (2007) develops his autopoietic enactivism based on the autopoietic
organization of biological life. On his view, mental life should be seen as a part of
bodily life such that it cannot be reduced to processing in the brain. Instead, it should
be understood through its role in the world (p. ix). A cell or a multicellular organism is
not merely self-maintaining. We should also see an actively topological boundary
demarcating the inside of an organism from its outside and actively regulating the
organism’s interaction with the environment (p. 64). Accordingly, Thompson
encourages us to find intentionality in organisms’ operational closure and dynamic
interaction with the environment. In this way, Thompson agrees with Dennett’s
statement that “intentionality doesn't come from on high; it percolates up from
below”7 (p. 160).
Proponents of autopoietic enactivism employ the idea of autopoiesis in order to
discover the origin of cognition. This so-called “bottom-up” approach insists that
finding the principles of biological organization is the most productive way to
understand what cognition is, what it does, and how it evolved (Barrett 2018; cf.
Schlicht and Starzak 2019). This idea opposes that of taking human cognition as a
paradigm and generalizing it to simpler forms of cognition. I am not taking a side
between these two approaches; there is probably something valuable in both.

7

Dennett 1995, p. 205.
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4.2 Anti-realism about Representational Content
Interestingly, content pragmatism and enactivism have a similar attitude towards
representational content. I will examine the reason why representationalism based on
structural similarities is rejected by some enactivists. As we have briefly seen in
Section 2, structural similarity, or isomorphism, is a relation between a model or a
map and what it represents. Structural similarity holds when an internal state and an
external condition are structurally similar. Defenders of structural representationalism
claim that structural similarity ground the representational content. As O’Brien (2016)
says, representational vehicles are “contentful in virtue of resembling their
represented objects” (p. 9). But Egan (forthcoming, p. 7) argues that structural
similarity is not sufficient to underwrite determinate contents. Enactivists raise a
similar objection.
The first reason offered by Segundo-Ortin and Hutto (2019) is that if the
representational content of a model or map is completely determined by what it
structurally mirrors, then what it represents is indeterminate (pp. 7-8). They give an
example: suppose that there is a map which is said to contentfully represent Sydney.
The metrical relations among the constituent elements of the map mirror those of
Sydney. But they imagine that the same map also mirrors the spatial layout of New
York City (or another city with a similar layout), though to a different degree. Then it
seems that the map represents both Sydney and New York City, and so the
representational content is indeterminate.
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Segundo-Ortin and Hutto (2019) have taken two responses into consideration.
One is that the representational content of the map is fixed not only by what it is
structurally similar with, but also by what the map is “in fact used to deal with”
(Godfrey-Smith 2006, p. 58). Another response is that representational content is also
fixed by the casual relations that bring the representational vehicle into existence, in
other words, by what they are selected for in the cognitive process (Ramsey 2016; cf.
Segundo-Ortin and Hutto 2019). However, some enactivists respond that whether the
fact that one item structurally mirrors another item does not suffice for one to
contentfully represent the other. Hutto and Segundo-Ortin contends that structural
similarities are not inherently contentful (2019, p. 8). For example, we can use
variations in the height of liquid column of a mercury thermometer to accurately
make an inference about the changes of temperature, but it is a separate question
whether the structural similarities (here the variations in the height) in themselves
contentfully represent things (here the changes in the temperature).
Following this reasoning, we can make some truth-relevant inference about a fact
in the environment, by relying on a device with a similar structure. This practice can
be very successful, but it does not entail that the structural similarity suffices for the
representation to have a definite content. At least, the content seems not always be
inherently fixed by the similarity. We can presuppose that structural similarities are
contentful, but to explain how and why they are contentful is a difficult task. This
problem is labeled as “Hard Problem of Content” by radical enactivists (Hutto and
Myin 2013). Since I do not know how to solve this problem, I would for now contend
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that, at least in some cases, people endow representations with certain contents out of
their pragmatic concerns—not because contents are always fixed by certain structural
similarities.
Segundo-Ortin and Hutto (2019) argues that “if structural similarities do not
suffice for or entail content, then a fortiori they do not get their cognitive work done
in virtue of possessing content” (p. 9). Content pragmatists can happily accept this
contention, because for them, there is no natural condition to constrain
representational content. What gets the cognitive work done are representational
vehicles. However, radical enactivists seem to go too far when they claim that
cognition does not always involve representations. If enactivists stop at the claim that
cognition does not always involve representational content, then enactivism can be
compatible with content pragmatism. It appears to be acceptable to say that structural
similarity is insufficient for representational content (instead of representations).
Being anti-realists about representational content but realists about representations
seems to be an option which radical enactivists have ignored.

4.3 Representational Enactivism
Autopoietic enactivism seems convincing mostly in the case of very basic forms of
cognition; perhaps also for the kinds of cognition characteristic of simple organisms
like bacteria. However, as Schlicht and Starzak comment (2019, p. 23), even if we
should understand cognition in simple organisms as non-representational, nonrepresentational cognition would not easily generalize to more complex organisms.
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The existence of the most primitive form of cognition does not, therefore, support the
radical enactivists’ claim that perception in all non-human animals is nonrepresentational.
A relevant worry is whether enactivism can make any contribution to fruitful
representationalist theories. In the opinion of content pragmatists, the identification of
the representational content is always dependent on pragmatic considerations. But if
the pragmatic considerations are to explain how an organism actively interacts with
the environment for its self-organization, autopoietic enactivism can help to identify
the content of representations. For example, if you are interested in interpreting a
frog’s behavior in terms of its ability to self-organize, it seems more appropriate to
assign the representation in the frog’s brain the content of nutritious food, not a small
dark moving thing.
It seems that integrating content pragmatism and autopoietic enactivism benefits
both views: enactivists can take a pragmatic stance towards representational content
without committing to robust realism in cases where representational terms feature in
our best scientific explanations. At the same time, enactivism can allow that pragmatic
considerations on the biological level sometimes help to identify the appropriate
representational contents.
I will use a bacterium’s cognitive ability as an example. Thompson (2007, p. 103)
lists three criteria for characterizing life in terms of autopoiesis: (1) Semipermeable
Boundary: the system is defined by a semipermeable boundary made up of molecular
components. This boundary can be used to discriminate between the inside and
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outside of the system. (2) Reaction Network: the components are being produced by a
network of reactions that take place within the boundary. (3) Interdependency: (1) and
(2) are interdependent. Bacteria are autopoietic because they satisfy all three criteria.
Therefore, according to Varela and Maturana (1980)’s definition of cognition,
cognition is present in bacteria, even though they are relatively simple lifeforms.
There is a bacterium having a cognitive ability to sense the concentration of
sucrose in the environment and to move accordingly. We can interpret that cognitive
ability as an instance of fulfilling self-maintenance done by a closed and automatic
system, which satisfies the definition of autopoiesis. I have already noted in Section 2
Egan does not think there are any naturalistic conditions for content (of
representations in mindless systems), otherwise there is nothing special about
human’s mental representations (forthcoming, p. 27). According to content
pragmatism, the job of connecting the naturalistic theory with the target phenomenon
is left for a gloss. Thus, when it comes to bacteria, we can find a gloss “acquiring
nutrition for self-maintenance”, which is inspired by biological evidence, so that we
can make sense of that bacterium’s cognitive process described above. In this case,
“acquiring sucrose because it is nutritional for self-maintenance” seems to be an
appropriate gloss for the representational content.
I have so far emphasized the ways that representational enactivism claims the
advantages of both autopoietic enactivism and content pragmatism. But a
representationalist need not believe that representational content is always dependent
on pragmatic considerations to benefit from what autopoietic enactivists say about the
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origin of cognition. A robust realist can have very good neuroscientific reasons to
believe that human cognition should be defined by representational mental states. But
she can also embrace the idea of autopoietic enactivism when other forms of
cognition are of concern, and whenever neuroscientific evidence is not available.
Enactivists can also benefit from this understanding of representational content,
but need to commit to its relevance across the board. Notice that although Thompson
(2007) focuses on embodied and enactive acts, he does not give up representations
altogether. Instead, in several places of his book, he seems to challenge some
interpretations of representations and promotes an understanding of representation
that fits well with autopoietic enactivism. Thompson’s understanding of
representations can be found in his comparison between code and DNA (p. 182): a
representational system of code is composed of arbitrary referential relations between
the symbols and what they stand for. However, DNA is not representational in this
way because it is a component of the autopoietic process and the relation between
DNA and the information it contains is not arbitrary. It is unacceptable to say that
DNA “contains the information for phenotypic design” because this piece of
information is contained in the autopoietic network as a whole instead of any
component.
The representational version of enactivism I defend has the same feature: the
representational content of any part of the organism should not be considered
independently of other parts of the whole autopoietic network. The autopoietic
process determines the content of representations by specifying the characteristics of
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each part of the organism. The representational content, therefore, should be
understood by reference to how a sub-function contributes to a global autopoietic
process. This idea can be useful when understanding the representational content of a
non-human animal or plant (or of its part): the content should be identified based on
the autopoietic network because the autopoietic system in its entirety specifies the
function and the semantics.
One difficulty of integrating enactivism and computationalism8 pointed out by
Casper and Artese (2020) is that different heuristics are implicit in the two views.
While enactivists explain cognitive processes in integrative terms, computationalists
often attempt to localize cognitive processes, and specify how each local part of a
functional mechanism processes input and produces output. For this reason, they
claim that radical embodied views, including enactivism, are incompatible with
decompositional and localizational strategies. It is not clear, however, why enactivists
must reject localization.
Non-radical enactivists like Thompson, for instance, would have no problem
appealing to representations found in any part of the organism, such as representations
within DNA. But they may be more interested in finding out how a certain subfunction contribute to the global function. And according to pragmatic concerns, the
content of local representations can be determined by the global autopoietic process.
I am not saying that the enactive approach should be taken on every form of

Piccinini (2008) separates representationalism from computationalism. The form of computationalism that is
difficult to be integrated with enactivism, according to Casper and Artese (2020), is representational
computationalism.
8
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cognition. However, for the study of simpler organisms where neurological evidence
is not available—e.g., if techniques like fMRI are not suitable—a thorough
investigation into the autopoietic system might helpfully inform efforts to identify the
content of the relevant representations. The representational enactivism defended in
this essay can in these ways supplement mainstream representationalist theories.

5. Conclusion
Finally, I want to emphasize that the enactive point of view need not undermine
representational approaches. For example, it seems that autopoietic enactivism can be
even integrated into an informational teleosemantic framework. Advocates of
informational teleosemantics say that what it takes to possess and process
representations is to process information for a control function (Neander 2017; cf.
Piccinini 2020). In an enactive context, the content of a teleosemantic representation
should match the specific function played by the parts of the autopoietic system.
Consider an organ of the autopoietic system. It processes representations to identify
and optimize the conditions needed to maintain itself. The representational content is
determined by that specific function.
What I described is representational enactivism based on informational
teleosemantics. For radical enactivists, a view like this would be much more difficult
to accept. Informational teleosemantics is a naturalistic theory, and it claims that each
token of representation is caused by a certain function (Neander 2017). The
representational content is fixed once the function is confirmed. Representational
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enactivism based on content pragmatism, on the other hand, would deny that there is
any naturalistic basis for content.
Since radical enactivists are eliminativists about representations, they are not
willing to admit that representational content can be settled by some biological
functions. Nor that any representational content is real. But they might be willing to
say that the use of representational content is done only out of pragmatic concerns.
But non-radical enactivists, like Thompson, could accept the idea that representational
content is fixed by certain function as long as that the function is an autopoietic
function.
This essay has argued that an integration between enactivism and
representationalism is possible and deserves serious consideration. Embracing
representationalism would allow enactivists to give a more convincing,
neuroscientifically informed account of cognition, and embracing enactivism can help
representationalists identify the representational contents of basic and non-human
forms of cognition. For these reasons, representational enactivism may provide a
fuller picture of cognition.
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